I guess my question would be better phrased like... what does a "person that might exist" correspond to in the real world, outside of a thought experiment? I can only think of a hypothetical soul or something similar, but maybe you have something else in mind?
Well, in this case, we're talking about two different theories that predict the existence of different numbers of people that you might presently be. E.g. if there are two theories, one of which says there are infinite earths, the other of which says that there is just one earth, because you might be on any of the earths, you should adopt the other theory.
It was a question not a pronouncement, see the question mark at the end of the sentence.
How do you square this with your commitment to simplicity? Beth 2 people, Beth 2 Earths, all possible worlds exist, sounds like a lot of complexity to explain some simple things.
This is excellent. I think the same kind of reasoning can do a great job of proving the existence of an all-malevolent being (a child rapist exists —> Beth 2 child rapists exist via SIA—> this is super duper likely under the theory that evil god is real but really awkward under atheism). Or—and this would actually make theism a better fit with empirics—it could be used to prove the existence of an infinitely powerful being that has a preference for a mediocrity of value; some things are good, some things are bad, most things are neutral, so perhaps if there is any creator being at all, it has a preference for that kind of mix, neither maximizing goodness nor badness. Just use some bundle of good, bad, and neutral things as the variable for the SIA.
To give the SIA its due, I do think the SIA offers some support for multiverse cosmologies. Also it offers support for the belief that others are conscious like me, not philosophical zombies.
Let me first be clear on the extent to which your existence does give you evidence for the pet rocks. From SIA, your existence gives you evidence that there are more people that you might presently be. Thus, you should favor theories on which there are more people with your experiences--which will include your experience of interacting with rocks. Therefore, directly from SIA, you get some evidence for many rocks--specifically, you get evidence that there are copies of you that have the experience of seeing rocks.
However, what SIA does not license you to do is conclude that there are more rocks of the sort that aren't seen by observers you might presently be. SIA has no preference for hypotheses on which, say, space is filled with rocks, so that one of them might be rocky.
The reason for this is rather straightforward: suppose we are not origin essentialists about rocks (if we are, of course, then there being other rocks that you don't see doesn't affect at all the odds of the rock existing that happens to be in front of you, and thus the parody would fail for an even more straightforward reason). It's true, on such an assumption, that the odds of Rocky existing are higher if the world has more rocks. But the odds are no higher that Rocky would exist and be seen by you. If there are more rocks, assuming you only see one of them, then while any rock is likelier to exist, it's no likelier to be seen by you.
This is crucially different from your existence: no matter where you exist, you'd be the first to know about it.
One thing that's also worth noting is that while the principles may sound similar, none of the motivations can be parodied. I challenge you to find one argument for SIA that also applies to the rock case, other than simply the bare intuition that a thing is likelier to exist if there are more of it, which is not analogous for the reasons described above.
In particular, if one surveys the primary principled probabilistic basis for SIA, it is illustrated by the following case. Suppose that one person gets created, then a coin gets flipped, and if it comes up tails, a second person gets created. Not being created and knowing your birth rank, SIA reasons:
The odds you're the first person and the coin will come up heads = the odds that you're the first person and the coin will come up tails = the odds you're the second person and the coin will come up tails.
Thus, tails is twice as likely as heads.
Now note, this makes crucial reference to the fact that you're uncertain about which of two people you might presently be. It thus does not apply to rocks or any other object in the material world.
In section 2.2 it seems that you perhaps even grant the core point that consciousness is not analogous. You ask: if the rock were conscious, should it be confident that God exists? Yes! It's not just people who should, by SIA, think they are numerous: it's any conscious creature.
Note, of course, that I do not claim that you should be certain of God's existence based on the anthropic argument, contrary to what you indicate on various occasions. I claim that it is evidence for God.
Note additionally that I never claim that Beth 2 is the biggest infinity--it's obviously not. Rather, I say Beth 2 is a lower bound on the number of possible people.
Regarding shrimp, yes, you should think there are Beth 2 shrimp at least, just as you should think there are Beth 2 rocks and so on. But this is because you should think there are Beth 2 versions of you seeing rocks and shrimp, and to see a rock or shrimp requires there being such things.
The SIA wasn't invented by me--it has been defended and criticized by some extremely smart people. Such people, in the academic community, do not make this criticism. If you find yourself thinking a philosophical view held by smart and competent people is obviously stupid for a simple reason, that strangely has yet to show up among its academic critics, you should generally reconsider.
My only problem with the argument is that lithic works better than rockthropic.
How does "people you could possibly be" work? Could I be, for instance, you? If yes, could I be a member of the species from which h sapiens evolved? Could I be rocky the pebble? Why not?
It's people that you might presently be. There's no chance you are presently me. However, if there are two people with your name and life history, each on identical but faraway planets, you might be either of them. For all you know, you might currently be either one. SIA says you should think there are more people such that for all you know, you might be them now. For a more precise definition, see https://benthams.substack.com/p/precisely-defining-the-self-indication
I can't even reason about being anyone else but me because if I were anyone else on another planet I wouldn't be me. How do you expect one to reason about things like this?
You know that you are you. You don't know which person you are. If there are two earths at different universal coordinates, you don't know which of them you are presently on.
I do know that I am me. If they are separated by spatial location then their brain states will be different in some respect so there will be two different people.
Yes but you don't know which of them you are!!!! I am not saying they are the same person, I am saying they are two people such that you don't know which you are.
Analogy: Bob and Jon are created. You can't remember if you're Bob or Jon. You might be either based on your evidence, even though they're not the same person!
“Should Shrimpy have an infinite credence in God after hearing the Shrimpthropic Argument? By the reasoning used, he (or she/they/it) should.”
Why exactly would this be a problem? If a shrimp had access to reason and fine-tuning data they could infer the existence of God too. Does this prove that the fine-tuning argument fails?
The good thing about your rocktropic argument: it was so fun to read about. The bad thing about it: it reminded me of BB's argument and I got another headache
This is hilariously written (you’re getting a follow), but I think this counter is pretty bad for basically the reason Matthew says.
What exactly are "possible observers"? Reeks of dualism to me.
Ask Matthew, he made the argument up I just parodied it
People that might exist. That's it!
Calm down, the post was meant to be a bit of fun mixed with some philosophy, no need to get so wound up.
I guess my question would be better phrased like... what does a "person that might exist" correspond to in the real world, outside of a thought experiment? I can only think of a hypothetical soul or something similar, but maybe you have something else in mind?
Well, in this case, we're talking about two different theories that predict the existence of different numbers of people that you might presently be. E.g. if there are two theories, one of which says there are infinite earths, the other of which says that there is just one earth, because you might be on any of the earths, you should adopt the other theory.
So there are Beth 2 Earths as well now?
Yes. There are infinite people you might be. You know you are on Earth. Thus, there are infinite Earths!
I would recommend learning something about anthropics before making confident pronouncements about it.
It was a question not a pronouncement, see the question mark at the end of the sentence.
How do you square this with your commitment to simplicity? Beth 2 people, Beth 2 Earths, all possible worlds exist, sounds like a lot of complexity to explain some simple things.
This is excellent. I think the same kind of reasoning can do a great job of proving the existence of an all-malevolent being (a child rapist exists —> Beth 2 child rapists exist via SIA—> this is super duper likely under the theory that evil god is real but really awkward under atheism). Or—and this would actually make theism a better fit with empirics—it could be used to prove the existence of an infinitely powerful being that has a preference for a mediocrity of value; some things are good, some things are bad, most things are neutral, so perhaps if there is any creator being at all, it has a preference for that kind of mix, neither maximizing goodness nor badness. Just use some bundle of good, bad, and neutral things as the variable for the SIA.
To give the SIA its due, I do think the SIA offers some support for multiverse cosmologies. Also it offers support for the belief that others are conscious like me, not philosophical zombies.
Thank you thank you thank you
unfortunately, your parody argument fails, as Rocky is not a rock but a pebble
Racist!
Sigh!
This is the parody everyone immediately thinks of, and the disanalogy has been explained in various places, including here https://benthams.substack.com/p/defending-olum-against-bostrom-and?utm_source=publication-search and here https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-024-04686-w. I feel as though I spend about a third of my life explaining why this parody--"if SIA is true, why not think there are loads of other things, like chairs and tables and rocks"--explaining why it's false. This includes by email, in person, and by phone.
Let me first be clear on the extent to which your existence does give you evidence for the pet rocks. From SIA, your existence gives you evidence that there are more people that you might presently be. Thus, you should favor theories on which there are more people with your experiences--which will include your experience of interacting with rocks. Therefore, directly from SIA, you get some evidence for many rocks--specifically, you get evidence that there are copies of you that have the experience of seeing rocks.
However, what SIA does not license you to do is conclude that there are more rocks of the sort that aren't seen by observers you might presently be. SIA has no preference for hypotheses on which, say, space is filled with rocks, so that one of them might be rocky.
The reason for this is rather straightforward: suppose we are not origin essentialists about rocks (if we are, of course, then there being other rocks that you don't see doesn't affect at all the odds of the rock existing that happens to be in front of you, and thus the parody would fail for an even more straightforward reason). It's true, on such an assumption, that the odds of Rocky existing are higher if the world has more rocks. But the odds are no higher that Rocky would exist and be seen by you. If there are more rocks, assuming you only see one of them, then while any rock is likelier to exist, it's no likelier to be seen by you.
This is crucially different from your existence: no matter where you exist, you'd be the first to know about it.
One thing that's also worth noting is that while the principles may sound similar, none of the motivations can be parodied. I challenge you to find one argument for SIA that also applies to the rock case, other than simply the bare intuition that a thing is likelier to exist if there are more of it, which is not analogous for the reasons described above.
In particular, if one surveys the primary principled probabilistic basis for SIA, it is illustrated by the following case. Suppose that one person gets created, then a coin gets flipped, and if it comes up tails, a second person gets created. Not being created and knowing your birth rank, SIA reasons:
The odds you're the first person and the coin will come up heads = the odds that you're the first person and the coin will come up tails = the odds you're the second person and the coin will come up tails.
Thus, tails is twice as likely as heads.
Now note, this makes crucial reference to the fact that you're uncertain about which of two people you might presently be. It thus does not apply to rocks or any other object in the material world.
In section 2.2 it seems that you perhaps even grant the core point that consciousness is not analogous. You ask: if the rock were conscious, should it be confident that God exists? Yes! It's not just people who should, by SIA, think they are numerous: it's any conscious creature.
Note, of course, that I do not claim that you should be certain of God's existence based on the anthropic argument, contrary to what you indicate on various occasions. I claim that it is evidence for God.
Note additionally that I never claim that Beth 2 is the biggest infinity--it's obviously not. Rather, I say Beth 2 is a lower bound on the number of possible people.
Regarding shrimp, yes, you should think there are Beth 2 shrimp at least, just as you should think there are Beth 2 rocks and so on. But this is because you should think there are Beth 2 versions of you seeing rocks and shrimp, and to see a rock or shrimp requires there being such things.
The SIA wasn't invented by me--it has been defended and criticized by some extremely smart people. Such people, in the academic community, do not make this criticism. If you find yourself thinking a philosophical view held by smart and competent people is obviously stupid for a simple reason, that strangely has yet to show up among its academic critics, you should generally reconsider.
My only problem with the argument is that lithic works better than rockthropic.
How does "people you could possibly be" work? Could I be, for instance, you? If yes, could I be a member of the species from which h sapiens evolved? Could I be rocky the pebble? Why not?
It's people that you might presently be. There's no chance you are presently me. However, if there are two people with your name and life history, each on identical but faraway planets, you might be either of them. For all you know, you might currently be either one. SIA says you should think there are more people such that for all you know, you might be them now. For a more precise definition, see https://benthams.substack.com/p/precisely-defining-the-self-indication
I can't even reason about being anyone else but me because if I were anyone else on another planet I wouldn't be me. How do you expect one to reason about things like this?
You know that you are you. You don't know which person you are. If there are two earths at different universal coordinates, you don't know which of them you are presently on.
I do know that I am me. If they are separated by spatial location then their brain states will be different in some respect so there will be two different people.
Yes but you don't know which of them you are!!!! I am not saying they are the same person, I am saying they are two people such that you don't know which you are.
Analogy: Bob and Jon are created. You can't remember if you're Bob or Jon. You might be either based on your evidence, even though they're not the same person!
“Should Shrimpy have an infinite credence in God after hearing the Shrimpthropic Argument? By the reasoning used, he (or she/they/it) should.”
Why exactly would this be a problem? If a shrimp had access to reason and fine-tuning data they could infer the existence of God too. Does this prove that the fine-tuning argument fails?
The good thing about your rocktropic argument: it was so fun to read about. The bad thing about it: it reminded me of BB's argument and I got another headache